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The media sector is vital to the quality of democracies, yet its products or services are often 
traded in commercial markets. In Latin America, media markets are usually dominated by 
only a few large commercial media companies. Regulation often dates back to the times of 
military dictatorships, while neoliberal reforms have later accelerated concentration 
tendencies and increased the emphasis on commercial logics. The current state of the media 
sector is increasingly criticized as posing severe limits to processes of democratic 
deliberation, illegitimately concentrating political power and complementing other forms of 
social exclusion. In the last few years, calls for democratizing media markets have been 
echoed in some countries by policy reforms in the broadcasting sector. This paper sketches the 
regulatory challenge of democratizing predominantly commercial and concentrated 
broadcasting markets in Latin America. I demonstrate that commercial diversification is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for plural media markets. Furthermore, debates about 
―democratization‖ go beyond the commercial diversity of media channels and rather address 
the conditions of access to the public sphere. Against the background of recent legislation in 
Uruguay, Argentina and Chile, I identify a trend toward the promotion of non-commercial 
broadcasters. Although media regulation is partly modernized to account for democratic 
demands, the extent of the reforms differs greatly. As the democratization of concentrated 
media markets conflicts with the interests of commercial firms, such reforms are only to be 
expected where active social movements push for changes. 
Keywords: Latin America (Uruguay, Argentina, Chile); democratization of media markets; 
media regulation; community radios 
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La comunicación es una cosa demasiado seria para dejársela 
sólo a los medios de comunicación.
1
 
Benoît Hervieu,  
representative for the Americas of Reporters Without Borders 
 
The regulation of media markets is a tricky issue. The existence of diverse media is 
considered a prerequisite for functioning plural democracies because the media transports 
ideas, amplifies and spreads public opinion and communicates government policies. Media 
content is ―part of the lifeblood of democracy‖ (Feintuck & Varney, 2006, p. 249). However, 
media goods are often produced and traded in commercial markets. These markets show some 
characteristics that contravene the idea of plurality and lead to the concentration of ownership 
and homogenization of content. Latin American media markets are particularly driven by 
commercial logics, and the high income concentration across the continent is paralleled by 
concentrated ownership structures in the media market (Becerra & Mastrini, 2009). For a long 
time, social movements and scholars alike have pointed at the negative consequences for a 
democratic public sphere (Dahlgren, 1995), as rich media, in the words of McChesney (1999), 
lead to poor democracy. While direct governmental censorship is rather uncommon in 
contemporary Latin America, new types of exclusion have emerged in connection with 
―economic censorship‖, as eonomic criteria determine which information is available. Many 
years after the political systems returned to electoral democracies, calls for democratizing the 
media sector are increasing and in some countries answered with policy reforms. 
This article
2
 puts recent media reforms in context and discusses the democratization of 
broadcasting markets from a regulatory perspective. Three case studies of recent legislation in 
Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile provide the empirical background. I highlight that policy 
reforms in the three countries show some common characteristics in focusing on community 
                                               
1 English: ―Communication is too important to leave it up only to the media‖. Hervieu, in a comment published 
in the Argentinean newspaper Página/12 (Hervieu, 2010), paraphrased the saying of the French politician 
Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929), who said that ―war is too important to be left to the generals‖. 
2
 A previous version of this article was presented at the 52
nd
 Annual Convention of the ISA in Montreal in March 
2011. The author would like to thank all participants of this panel, Daniel Schulz and particularly Matthias 
Kranke for their instructive feedback and encouragement. 
  
3 
radios to address regulatory challenges arising from commercial media markets. The reforms, 
however, differ greatly in scope. This article draws on literature from communication studies 
and the regulation school, supplemented by the study of the recent legal documents and four 
qualitative interviews. 
 
In the following section, I contextualize the calls to democratize the media market by 
characterizing the transition to democracy as an ―unfinished business‖, where spaces for 
popular participation have remained limited. This debate on democratizing media markets is 
then taken up from a regulatory perspective. By looking at the particular characteristics of 
media markets, I discuss the regulatory challenges for plurality and democratic access in the 
broadcasting market. The next section presents the three case studies of recent broadcasting 
legislation in southern Latin America. Then, I analyze the results of the case studies, before 
reflecting on the findings in the concluding section. 
 
The transition from authoritarian rule and its limits in the media market 
 
The reforms in media regulation aimed at the democratization of the broadcasting sector can 
be seen in the broader context of the transition from authoritarian rule. By the end of the 
1970s, most countries in the continent, including Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, were ruled by 
authoritarian military dictatorships. Oppositional media was shut down and media content 
subject to direct censorship of the executive (Bresnahan, 2002). In Argentina, Art. 7 of the 
Broadcasting Law of 1980, in force until 2010, explicitly demanded that broadcasting serve 
the necessities of ―national security‖, the doctrine under which any opposition was suppressed 
and thousands of citizens ―disappeared‖ during the military rule (1976–1983). Democracy 
was re-established when elected governments took over in 1983 (Argentina), 1985 (Uruguay) 
and 1990 (Chile).  
 
In many spheres, democratic rule remained a formal enterprise with limited space for 
participation (Avritzer, 2002). The state of democracy in the continent demonstrates the limits 
of classic models of democracy that neglect the importance of social structures and instead 
focus primarily on institutional variables (Linz, 1990; O'Donnell, 1999). In this perspective, 
the transition in Latin America is often reduced to ―the restoration of political competition 
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among elites‖ (Avritzer, 2002, p. 5). Here, the media market is an insightful example, because 
it constitutes an important part of a vibrant public sphere as precondition for democracy—and 
because it itself is an example for the limited role granted to democracy. 
 
The democratization of political institutions has not been followed by a democratization of the 
public sphere with respect to the media. Political censorship or content control by the 
executive was replaced with other forms of exclusion. Neoliberal policies of deregulation 
sustained and perpetuated a situation in which access to mass communication is determined 
predominantly by economic criteria (González-Rodríguez, 2008). Few large and highly 
integrated conglomerates dictate Latin American media markets. Alternative and grass roots 
media, particularly community radios, played an important role in the transition to democracy 
(Bresnahan, 2007, p. 218), but afterwards struggled for legal recognition in democracy (see 
below). In 1993, Chile legally recognized ―low power radios‖ while forbidding them to seek 
funding through advertisements. In Argentina, profit orientation was even set as a prerequisite 
to apply for a regular frequency until 2005. These developments indicate a paradoxical 
situation, where formal democratization has not facilitated democratic access to the public 
sphere.
3
 Rather, ―economic censorship‖ in various forms determines the range of voices to be 
heard. 
 
Forms of ―economic censorship‖ went hand in hand with a close connection between the 
political elite and the large media enterprises. This relation went both ways: One the one 
hand, politicians used their discretion to allot frequencies and public advertisement to their 
allies (see discussions of cases below). On the other hand, media owners became politically 
active, either by entering politics themselves or by using their media outlets deliberately to 
influence politics (Boas, 2005; Page, 1996). While political influence of media might be 
common in any society, this specific phenomenon is characteristic of the oligopolistic market 
structures in Latin America. The persistence of media’s entanglement with conservative 
political elites has led to several clashes with elected leftist governments. Some incidents in 
                                               
3
 In Mexico, one could even observe that grass roots community radios were mostly ignored under the 
authoritarian rule of the PRI, while over the course of democratization, they were more harshly repressed and 
many shut down under the presidency of the PAN (see Klinger in this issue). 
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recent years have demonstrated conservative media’s open resentment toward elected leaders 
when the former felt affected in their own political interests.
4
 
Thus, from this perspective, the transition to democracy can be seen as an ―unfinished 
business‖ when it comes to the media and their role in constituting a public sphere. Calls for 
reforms aimed at the democratization of media markets must be understood in this context. 
The following section takes up this debate from a regulatory perspective. 
 
The regulatory challenge of democratic media markets 
Characteristics of a commercial broadcasting market: Ownership concentration and 
content homogenization 
 
The broadcasting sector shows particular characteristics that result from its structure and 
distinguish it from markets for other goods. Three of these particularities merit scholarly 
attention to understand the regulatory challenges of ensuring a plurality of perspectives: 1) the 
scarcity of the spectrum; 2) the low marginal costs of the goods produced, leading to 
concentration; and 3) the mediated commercial relationship between broadcasters and 
audience. 
 
First, the radiomagnetic spectrum is a scarce resource because the number of available 
frequencies is limited (Aitken, 1994). Therefore, the number of possible stations airing on the 
radiomagnetic spectrum is limited as well, which distinguishes the broadcasting sector from 
other sectors. With standard private goods sectors, there is no such limit: At least theoretically, 
there may always be a further sort of packed tomato soup on offer, and the consumer can 
choose more or less freely which one to buy. 
 
Second, because of the nature of the goods produced, there is a tendency toward horizontal 
and vertical integration of media companies (Hart, 2004, pp. 9, 18). Information and 
entertainment products have very low marginal costs. Once produced, the cost of offering the 
same content on a different media type (TV, radio, magazines or internet) or on different 
                                               
4 Three drastic examples cited by Reporters Without Borders include broad media support and incitement for an 
intended coup d’état 2002 in Venezuela and a ―successful‖ one in Honduras in 2009, as well as calls for 




channels of the same media type is very low while original production costs tend to be high. 
This leads to concentration processes, observable particularly in Latin America (Mastrini & 
Becerra, 2002, 2006). 
 
Third, the relationship between demand and supply in the media market is a mediated one 
because consumer demands do not directly translate into a specific supply. In the non-
subscription sector, the producer of the good (broadcasting station) is paid not by the audience 
as consumers but by firms advertising in the program. Thus, the commercial relationship 
ultimately consists not of a media product sold to an audience but of an audience ―sold‖ to 
advertising clients. The consumer, and particularly the citizen, is therefore limited in his or her 
choice and does not necessarily get what he or she wants to hear, but rather the program that 
generates the best deal for media and advertising companies. The advertising industry might 
even influence the survival of certain broadcasters, particularly in markets where only few 
advertising budgets are available (Barendt, 1995, p. 122). 
 
The elevated position of advertisers is a critical factor in the trend of content homogenization 
in competitive commercial broadcasting markets. Even in the context of ownership diversity, 
content is similar if different stations try to sell their audiences to the same advertising clients 
(McQuail, 1992, p. 175). Because of the dependency of stations on advertisement, ―they 
service audiences on advertisers’ terms‖ (Herman & McChesney, 1997, p. 190). Again this is 
particularly true for comparatively small markets in which advertising budgets are 
concentrated as well. Digitalization, trends of convergence, and the resulting increase in 
distribution channels have intensified competition because the available advertising budget 
has not increased proportionally. The ensuing struggle for viewers—and thus income—is 
usually fought at the expense of the quality of programs (Feintuck & Varney, 2006, p. 42). 
 
In sum, textbook free market competition does not exist in the media and communications 
markets. Synergy effects through vertical integration, economies of scale and high market 
entry barriers forestall the existence of a ―free market‖ with many suppliers (Herman & 
McChesney, 1997, p. 57). Deregulation in many countries thus unsurprisingly led to an 
―inevitable loss of diversity in media content‖ (Kogen, 2010, p. 335). Technical developments 
alter underlying market characteristics and somewhat reduce the scarcity argument, but they 
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do not fundamentally change the relation between media and democracy, and the role that 
regulation plays in this relationship (Garnham, 2000, p. 43). 
 
Competition and plurality 
 
The discussion of the economic characteristics of media goods shows the need for enforcing 
anti-trust laws to prevent concentration. However, diversified (commercial) ownership is not a 
sufficient criterion for plurality of perspectives, much less for democratic access. If a 
commercial character prevails, content diversity remains limited by the condition of 
profitability and access is determined by economic potency. Fierce competition might rather 
lead to a decrease in diversity, because it furthers homogenization of content as a result of the 
battle for advertisement revenues, making survival for small media much harder (Barendt, 
1995, p. 122). Thus, there is not necessarily a positive correlation between competitive 
markets and plural perspectives; both aspects rather constitute logically different dimensions. 
 
The distinction between the two dimensions of competition and plurality is visualized in 
Figure 1, together with the respective regulatory approaches.
5
 On the vertical axis, we find the 
economic dimension of ownership concentration with a monopolistic vs. competitive structure 
as the poles. This dimension might be regulated through competition law (―economic 
regulation‖). Yet the question of a plurality of perspectives constitutes a logically distinctive 
dimension (horizontal axis). From the combination of the two dimensions, four stylized 
situations arise. Theoretically, each of the four quadrants constitutes a possible regulatory 
outcome. To give an example, the lower right quadrant might occur under a public 
broadcasting monopoly that integrates diverse perspectives through the application of far-








                                               
5 The graph does not represent a typology of media systems (for that, see Hallin & Mancini, 2004), but only 
seeks to point at the seperate regulatory dimension. 





















A plural media landscape can therefore be considered a public good that is not provided by 
(free) markets. For many critical media observers, public broadcasting remains an important 
instrument to balance commercial enterprises (Feintuck & Varney, 2006, p. 104; Herman & 
McChesney, 1997, p. 196). However, there has never been a strong tradition of public 
broadcasting in Latin America. The continent followed the U.S. model of developing the 
broadcasting sector as a commercial endeavor from the very beginning. Family companies 
with strong patriarchal figures started the business and evolved into large-scale companies 
(Mastrini & Becerra, 2002, p. 2). A public broadcasting system was uncommon, not least 
because of the influence of U.S. businesses, which ―pushed relentlessly for a commercial 
media‖ (Herman & McChesney, 1997, p. 162). There have been ―public‖ media in some 
countries, albeit mostly managed directly by the government and thus serving more as 
instruments at the disposition of politicians in power (Hughes & Lawson, 2004, p. 99). Chile 
is at least partly an exception, as there is a strong public service television station TVN, 
reformed in 1992, which raises the standard for news. Still, TVN differs from the European 
model of public broadcasting because it has to finance itself via advertisements like its 
commercial competitors (Fuenzalida, 2002). Brazil, in 2007, established a public broadcasting 
company while Argentina has reformed existing state television in recent years to increase 
autonomy and reduce partisan coverage. 
 
Beyond plurality: The conditions of access and the three dimensions of 
regulation 
 
Calls for reform, however, went beyond establishing a public media system. The two separate 
dimensions discussed above (market structure and plurality of content) refer only to the 
―output‖ observable but disregard the ―input‖ conditions. But after all, this is what 
―democratization‖ refers to: participation in the public sphere. The access to means of 
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communication is the central characteristic of democratic media markets and thus the central 
challenge for regulation. Community radios can play a particular role here. They constitute 
means for direct intervention in the public sphere, might establish alternative discursive 
arenas and thus contribute to render possible democratic deliberations (Cabral Filho, 2009). 
 
When discussing media regulation with respect to democratization, one can distinguish three 
dimensions: regulatory goals, regulatory instruments and regulatory institutional structure. 
The regulatory goal is not necessarily plurality or ―democratic access‖. Media regulation 
might aim only for functioning markets, e.g., focusing on property rights and possibly on 
ownership structures, or even explicitly have minimal state influence as a goal. Other goals 
might include the promotion of national culture, assuring the inclusion of national minorities 
or communicating government policy. The problem here is that, in many cases, it is not easy 
to identify regulatory goals. Many regulatory approaches do not make their goals explicit nor 
have ―a clear value system underpinning them‖ (Feintuck & Varney, 2006, p. 5). In Latin 
America, media regulation has traditionally focused less on plurality than on market 
opportunities, specifically since the neoliberal reforms (Wiley, 2006). The right to and the 
freedom of expression are usually guaranteed in national constitutions, but this has not found 
its way into media-specific regulation. In conflicts about community radios broadcasting 
without a license, one can often observe that arguments highlighting the rights of 
communication do not weigh heavily. 
 
There is a broad range of regulatory instruments. Economic regulation aimed at market 
competition is not sufficient for plurality, as discussed above. Direct content regulation, on the 
other hand, is incompatible with democratic norms—some exceptions include age ratings for 
movie screening—because of the threat of censorship and the inherent difficulties of defining 
what ―plural content‖ means.6 Another indirect ―instrument‖ is public television, which 
interferes in competition by setting informal standards, e.g. with regard to the impartiality of 
news (Fuenzalida, 2002, p. 82). Regulation aimed at democratizing media markets is, 
however, additionally characterized by considerations of fair access conditions to the public 
sphere via the media. In the broadcasting sector, a crucial moment is the allocation of 
                                               
6 The problems of content regulation become obvious when looking at widely interpretable ―defamation 
paragraphs‖, prohibiting, among other things, declarations damaging the ―national image‖. Those stipulations 
may be (mis)used for political purposes against critical journalists to influence editorial lines and silence 
opposition (Buckley, Duer, Mendel, & O´Siochrú, 2008, p. 107). 
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frequencies. While in the past, frequencies where sometimes even auctioned (e.g., in Chile), 
the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) has noted repeatedly that the use 
of economic criteria as decisive elements in frequency allocation violates democratic 
principles (Gómez Germano, Aguerre, & Elíades, 2009, pp. 26–27). Reforms in the three 
countries have established a fixed range of frequencies reserved for non-commercial media, 
albeit only within a very narrow margin in Chile. Two additional aspects relevant for access to 
frequencies are technical standards for broadcasting equipment and administrative procedures 
in the application processes. Both function as barriers to alternative voices. Community radios 
frequently complain about high fees (AUNO, 2011) and excessive technical standards 
established under the pretext of guaranteeing a certain quality. Indeed, these standards also 
serve as means to keep competitors away from large media companies (some examples can be 
found in Gómez Germano et al., 2009, p. 28). 
 
Ultimately, regulatory structure refers to the institutional setting of regulatory agencies, their 
composition and competencies. As for other regulatory systems as well, there is a trend to 
integrate private (commercial and non-commercial) stake-holders into regulatory agencies 
(Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2005). With respect to the cases considered here, this is true for 
Uruguay and Argentina but not for Chile. These bodies execute the day-to-day application of 
the regulation and monitor compliance. Thus their precise composition has consequences for 
the relative significance of political criteria and the type of concerns that are heard and taken 
into consideration. Moreover, the composition of regulatory bodies reflects whether frequency 
management is understood as a merely technical endeavor to allocate frequencies according to 
externally set criteria, or whether the political character of granting frequencies is 
acknowledged and corresponding conflicts are treated as such. The case of the Chilean 
SUBTEL, managed by engineers, shows that political questions concerning the freedom of 
expression are not paid sufficient attention to if there is a predominantly technical self-
understanding (Interview Ortega, 2010). 
 
New media regulation in Uruguay, Argentina and Chile 
 
Uruguay, Argentina and Chile allow for excellent case studies because recent public 
discussions about media reform in these countries have explicitly centered on issues of 
democratization. In addition, they have passed new laws in the past few years that focus on 
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community radios and addressed the regulatory challenges discussed above. The level of 
reforms is, however, quite different in the three cases. Chile, in that regard, serves more as an 
example showing the difficulties of reforming commercial media markets. In other countries 
of the continent, such as Bolivia or Ecuador, media reform has more strongly addressed the 
role of government intervention or measures aimed at media content. The background of 
those reforms is more complex, and its discussion would go beyond the scope of this article. 
The case of Mexico and the difficult struggle of community radios to be legalized is discussed 
in detail in Klinger’s (2011) contribution in this issue. 
 
The background of the three countries considered here is quite similar. As in other parts of the 
continent, governments relied mostly on indirect regulation, not interfering strongly or 
establishing own media (Lugo-Ocando, 2008; Mastrini & Becerra, 2002, p. 3). Media 
regulation dates from the times of military rule; only Argentina replaced it with a new one in 
2009 after conflictive political debates. Concentration tendencies have gained momentum 
since the 1990s through neoliberal reforms, accelerating the trend toward the evolution of 
large conglomerates and increased influence of transnational media companies. 
 
Chile is a case in point although it has a relatively strong public television (TVN). However, 
this channel relies on revenues according to quotas and is subject to similar pressures as 
private media, but still enjoys some additional freedom (Fuenzalida, 2002). Nonetheless, 
Chile has a highly concentrated and predominately conservative media market. 
Commercialization and depoliticization have been pervasive since the return to democracy in 
1990 (Polumbaum, 2006, p. 377). Media concentration here is considered an important 
backup for the continuance of neoliberalism after military rule, since only the elite’s points of 
view are represented in media (González-Rodríguez, 2008). 
 
In Argentina, competition increased strongly after the neoliberal turn in the early 1990s, 
whereupon few media conglomerates (Grupo Clarín at the forefront) managed to dominate the 
news agenda thanks to a high degree of vertical and horizontal integration (Vialey, Belinche, 
& Tovar, 2008). Argentina is by far the largest media market of the three considered in this 
paper. Radio penetration is the highest in the region and reaches 99 % of the population. 
Concentration in radio is high, with over 80 % of the AM-market covered by the four largest 




Uruguay is the smallest of the three markets. In terms of content, it is highly dependent on 
Argentina and, to a lesser extent, Brazil, its two large Mercosur neighbors. The concentration 
in the media and telecommunication markets ranks among the highest in Latin America: the 
market leader reaches about 60% of turnovers and slightly less in audience. However, radio is 
still the most diverse sector with regard to ownership. Data are only available for the capital, 
where the four largest companies reach a market share of 37% (Mastrini & Becerra, 2006, pp. 
252, 269). 
 
Uruguay’s new community radio law in 2007 
 
The foundation of Uruguay’s current broadcasting regulation was laid in 1977 during the 
civil-military dictatorship. Even after the return to formal democracy in 1985, the military 
kept a say in frequency allocation (Faraone, 2002). A basic characteristic of ―regulation‖ until 
at least 2000 was the great discretionary power of the president, who regularly allocated 
frequencies to political or business friends. Criteria for allocation were the ―merit‖ of the 
applicant, ―convenience‖ or ―usefulness‖ (Lanza & López Goldaracena, 2009, pp. 238, 233; 
Mastrini & Becerra, 2006, p. 250). Part of that system was the selective and purposefully 
distributed official advertisement budget. Together, those two elements constituted political 
interference in the media, and were instrumental to silencing critical voices and securing the 
political support of the favored media (Lanza & López Goldaracena, 2009, p. 241). 
 
As a legacy from dictatorship, frequency regulation was part of the Ministry of Defense until 
2005, when through Decree 155/005 responsibility was shifted to the Ministry for Industry 
and Energy (Lanza & López Goldaracena, 2009, p. A15). Already in 2001, the regulatory 
body URSEC was created as a ―deconcentrated organ‖ within the executive. URSEC is 
responsible for the regulation and control of activities in the radioelectric spectrum, as well as 
for giving advice to the executive. It is entitled to operate under ―technical autonomy‖, but the 
executive appoints and dismisses the directors and can in all cases simply override decisions. 
Although certain rules exists to ensure that URSEC has no own (commercial) interests in the 
sector and has some independence vis-à-vis party politics, there is no political independence 




The adoption of the Law for Community Broadcast (Ley 18.232) in 2007 marked a turning 
point. This law, together with the regulatory decree 374/08 of the following year, was 
considered the most progressive in the continent at that time and established several important 
changes. For the first time, community radios were acknowledged in their social and 
communal functions as they materialize the right to communication and information. One 
third of the spectrum of every band is reserved for non-commercial radios, and licenses are 
given for 10 years. The most important criteria for the allocation are the presented plan for 
community services, the measures to ensure citizens’ participation in the communication 
project, and previous records. The process of license granting is made more transparent. 
Public tenders with previous public hearings are mandatory for all regular licenses. The 
problem for commercial radios, however, lies in informal practices. In reality, regular 
commercial licenses hardly exist. Instead, radios apply for ―precarious permits‖, 
circumventing some of the exigencies and public tenders. URSEC regularly renews those 
permits as long as technical requirements, penal and fiscal codes are not violated. Violations 
of the promised communication project or the (illegal) sale of program slots are not accounted 
for and largely ignored by the agency (Lanza & López Goldaracena, 2009, p. 236). 
 
In the institutional arena, two independent ―honorary advisory‖ bodies have been established, 
one each for commercial and community radios. Their members include politicians, 
academics, representatives of radio organizations, and, in one case, members sent by NGOs 
advocating the freedom of expression. They have to be heard on all occasions, but their 
recommendations remain not binding for the executive. 
 
These changes can be summed up as political efforts to promote non-commercial forms of 
communication. Although the regulatory foundation from military times is still in force, there 
have been important changes toward improving the exercise of the right to communicate. 
Technical requirements have been minimalized to not become barriers for community radios, 
the regulatory body now asks for the technical folder after granting the license and its 
technical staff is cooperating with the radios (Gómez Germano et al., 2009, pp. 28–29). Thus, 
the role of technical standards as barriers to communication is accounted for, yet there are still 
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important gaps between the norm and regulatory praxis.
7
 As is shown below, Argentina 
integrated parts of the Uruguayan reform into its new comprehensive law, which Uruguay, in 
turn, now takes up as a model for further reforms (Portal 180, 2010). 
 
Argentina’s new comprehensive media law from 2009 
 
Since 2009, when the ―Law on Audiovisual Communication Services‖ (―Ley SCA‖) was 
passed, Argentina has had perhaps the most progressive media regulation of the continent 
with regard to plurality. It changed the basic structure of regulation and frequency 
management.  
 
 The regulatory system in force before (Broadcasting Law 22.285 from 1980) was legislated 
by the last military junta, which led one of the bloodiest dictatorships from 1976 to 1983. 
Several changes were made in democracy, particularly during the neoliberal period under 
President Menem (1989—1999). The privatization of state-owned TV stations and some radio 
stations was made possible and the prohibition of cross-media ownership abolished (Marino, 
2009, p. 57). In 1999, the transfer of licenses was permitted, and the maximum number of 
licenses per person rose from 4 to 24. The constitutional reform of 1994 established 
superiority of international over national laws. Together with the bilateral investment treaty 
with the U.S., ratified in 1992, it made obsolete the limits on foreign capital shares in media 
companies. Living up to its reputation as a model student of the Washington Consensus, 
Argentina even privatized the frequency management in 1997. The center-left government of 
Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007) regained control of the spectrum in 2004 and introduced two 
further changes. In 2005, it allowed, for the first time, not-for-profit associations to apply for 
frequencies, following a Supreme Court decisions two years earlier (Marino, 2009, p. 62). 
Until then, profit orientation had been a prerequisite for a broadcasting license. Earlier the 
same year, however, Kirchner had given all current (commercial) licensees a decade-long 
indiscriminatory, additional prolongation, justified with the difficult economic recovery after 
the crisis some years earlier. 
 
                                               
7
 One example is the accepted acquisition of some radio stations by Mexican radio mogul Ángel González via 
figureheads, which is illegal according to the law. Although the commercial relation is obvious, URSEC refused 
to launch an investigation (Lanza & López Goldaracena, 2009, p. 246). 
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The regulatory body COMFER (Federal Committee for Broadcasting) was still directly 
dependent on the executive. Its directorate included—as a clear sign of its military junta 
heritage—three representatives from the military (Art. 96, Ley 22.285). The radio licenses 
were granted for 15 years plus an option for a 10-year extension. Community radios criticized 
the arbitrary treatment, and the mismatch between the legal rules and their application. The 
successive governments did nothing to combat increasing trends of concentration, fearing the 
conflict with powerful media companies and instead cultivated a close alliance. Even after the 
changes in 2005, community radios were disadvantaged by high technical and administrative 
demands (Marino, 2009, pp. 58, 67). Based on the initiative of several community radio 
organizations, a network of hundreds of individuals and organizations founded the ―Coalition 
for democratic broadcasting‖ in 2004, which came up with ―21 basic points for the right to 
communication‖. Those 21 points later became the basis for the new comprehensive media 
law (Interview Marino, 2010). This draft was widely discussed in society over several months 
and then, with over 300 amendments, sent to Congress (Interview Busso, 2010; Madres, 
2010). After several hearings in both chambers, it was passed in 2009 (Repoll, 2010). 
 
The new law introduced several changes, of which three merit particular mention. First, the 
regulatory goal of frequency allocation is set to ensure plurality. With respect to economic 
regulation, the maximum number of frequencies per legal person is reduced to 10 nationwide 
(before 24), while no person may own stations that together reach 35 % of the total population 
(equaling that of the capital Buenos Aires with its suburbs). Cross media ownership is 
severely limited. Second, to increase plurality and promote equal access, one-third of the 
spectrum in every band (TV, radio AM, radio FM) is reserved for non-profit organizations. 
Third, the institutional structure was changed. The regulatory body AFSCA (Federal Authority 
for Audiovisual Communication Services, former COMFER) is now a ―decentralized and 
autarchic organ in the realm of the executive power‖ (Art. 10, Ley SCA) with seven directors, 
of which only two are appointed by the executive. Additionally, there is a Federal Council of 
Audiovisual Communication (COFECOM) with 38 members from provincial governments 
and several sector representatives (including commercial and non-commercial broadcasters, 
indigenous population, universities, unions). This council is responsible for advising the 
executive and Congress, as well as for monitoring the compliance of the law (Art. 15). 
Depending on the majority situations in Congress and in the provinces, the government’s 
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party may not have the majority in these bodies. Together with other bodies created (including 
an office of an ombudsperson), there exist several cross-controls. 
 
Argentina changed its regulatory system by addressing access conditions and plurality. 
Regulation now reserves a large part of the available spectrum for non-commercial forms of 
communication, ensures greater institutional independence of the authorities and guarantees 
the inclusion of sector representatives. The regulatory agency actively promotes new 
community radios by organizing workshops and seminars. Yet community radios continue to 
complain about high fees that are not adequate for non-commercial neighborhood radios 
(AUNO, 2011). The intent to diversify media ownership away from previous monopolistic 
structures particularly affects Grupo Clarín, which has to sell several of its stations and 
licenses under to the new media law. Clarín initiated some lawsuits that postponed the 
adoption of the law (Interview Hauser, 2010; Marino, 2010). To this date (May 2011), Grupo 
Clarín still enjoys interim injunction, though the law as such entered into force in 2010. 
 
 
Chile’s new community radio law from 2010 
 
In Chile, the regulatory body for broadcasting SUBTEL (―Subsecretary for 
Telecommunication‖) is a subsecretary of the transport and telecommunication ministry. 
SUBTEL therefore forms part of the executive and does not formally include any private 
stakeholders. It is described as a highly technical organization, consisting of engineers not 
interested in the political, social or cultural aspects of communication (Interview Ortega, 
2010). The criteria for frequency allocation are purely technical. Every application contains a 
technical folder that is evaluated by SUBTEL and assigned a certain score. Content or cultural 
aspects are not relevant for the allocation. In the case of two equal offers, the frequency was 
auctioned until 2009; since then, the frequency has been allocated by lot. The technical and 
administrative requirements for applications are high and translate, in the absence of plurality-
favoring measures, into a restrictive environment for smaller and non-commercial radios. In 
1994, the category of ―radios of minimal coverage‖ was established, making it possible for 
some of the already existing community radios to be legalized (Bresnahan, 2007). The limits 
for this category, however, were very narrow. The maximum potency was set to 1 watt, which 
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allows for a radius of no more than 200 meters, licenses had to be renewed in a costly process 
every three years, and advertisements were forbidden. 
 
In the last years, ANARCICH, the largest organization representing community radios in 
Chile, intensified its efforts to improve conditions for community radios (Interview Cancino, 
2010). After years of arduous negotiation, a new law for community radios was passed in 
2010 (Ley 20.433). Licenses are now given for 10 years, potency is now limited to 25 watts in 
urban and 40 watts in rural areas. These are still restrictive limits that most radios need to 
exceed to communicate effectively in their urban quarter. Radios excessing those limits, or 
those broadcasting without a license, are still criminalized and shut down by the 
administration. Because of strong opposition from commercial radios, advertisements are still 
highly restricted to businesses residing in the covered area. For most rural radios, this 
translates into a de facto prohibition because in rural and indigenous communities, there are 
few businesses that have an advertising budget. Still, for the first time the social character of 
―community radios‖ is acknowledged and some legal improvements made. 
 
Critics from community radios, however, claim that the promise of increasing plurality cannot 
be fulfilled (Interview Ortega, 2010). Three concerns are noteworthy. First, advertisements are 
still severely restricted, which makes it difficult to sustain the expenses even of a not-for-
profit radio. Second, the reserved spectrum for community radios is so limited (about 4 %) 
that even the regulatory body SUBTEL admits that, with luck, this space can at best 
accommodate the already existing community radios—and even less, if all of those were 
allowed to transmit with 25 watts, which is still too low a level for meaningful 
communication. Third, there are no measures or criteria to promote plurality or to counter the 
trend toward concentration. As the lottery still decides a tie, commercially potent applicants 
can present several ―projects‖, increasing their chances of drawing a license. The technical 
requirements are not reduced while the administrative ones have even increased. 
Chile still has one of the most restrictive media laws from the perspective of community 
radios and one of the most unfavorable with regard to plurality from a regulatory perspective 
(Polumbaum, 2006). Nevertheless, the reform seeks—or at least pretends—to promote non-
commercial media, without interfering in media content. Rather than significantly improving 
access conditions for (new) non-commercial broadcasters to air their voice, the reform 
improves some legal conditions for existing radios, which by some are considered the only 
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alternative voice to mainstream neoliberal policy consensus. Still, no measures are introduced 
to deal with the concentrated commercial oligopoly. 
 
 
Toward democratic media markets? 
 
The three cases demonstrate that, more than two decades after formal transition to democracy, 
the democratization of the media sector figures prominently on the political agenda in Latin 
America. Reforms in the sector have been pushed by community radio associations and social 
movements: The Uruguayan law in 2007 has been drafted by members of AMARC; the 
Argentinean media law of 2009 emerged out of the Coalition for Democratic Broadcasting 
initiated by FARCO; and the Chilean community radio law was negotiated by ANARCICH. 
Those organizations all represent community radios. Strategic behavior, coalition building, 
and the political situation have led the governments to adopt part of this agenda (Interviews 
with Cancino, 2010 and Busso, 2010). Non-commercial broadcasters have been granted more 
favorable conditions in all three countries, though just to a small extent in Chile. This is 
reflected not only in the reservation of parts of the spectrum but also—again with the 
exception of Chile—in an active engagement of regulatory institutions to promote community 
radios. In Uruguay, administrative procedures have been simplified and adjusted to the 
capacities of social actors. In Argentina, the regulatory agency AFSCA, in close contact with 
organizations of community radios, even organizes workshops and seminars about technical 
and administrative questions. The advisory body COFECOM, which reports to Congress and 
has a say in many regulatory decisions, even elected Néstor Busso, a representative of 
community radios, as president. Still, even in Argentina community radios have recently 
complained about license fees that almost equal those for commercial radios and are thus 
excessive for many small initiatives. 
 
To place community radios at the center of democratization efforts acknowledges the 
regulatory characteristics of the commercially structured media markets. So far, the ownership 
concentration is addressed with adjusted competition rules only in Argentina. Commercial 
diversification is a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for democratic media 
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markets, not even for diversified content.
8
 Plurality can be enhanced by specific media 
regulation. However, not only is it very difficult to measure (Just, 2009), but governments or 
regulatory agencies also cannot directly increase plurality by simply providing ―missing 
perspectives‖. These difficulties apply particularly to the highly unequal and exclusive Latin 
America societies. Democratizing media sectors thus refers to democratic conditions of access 
and goes beyond plurality measured in output. The promotion of non-commercial and local 
forms of communication is thus, from a regulatory point of view, an innovative approach that 
might facilitate access to the public sphere(s) for different sectors of society. 
 
The three cases also show the different depth of the reforms. Indeed, in Chile, little has 
changed, and any practical advances toward a more accessible broadcasting system will 
depend on the implementation of the law. Argentina and Uruguay, by contrast, have gone 
furthest by reserving one-third of the spectrum for non-commercial broadcasting. In fact, this 
constitutes a kind of decommodification that pushes back market criteria and even the 
possibility to gain profit. There is a clear trend toward downsizing the importance of 
economic criteria in all three cases: Auctioning of licenses has stopped even in Chile, where a 
lottery now decides in situations of a tie, which still disadvantages economically less potent 
actors. Another trend in the other two countries is the inclusion of different stakeholders in the 
regulatory bodies. Their members now also represent commercial and non-commercial 
broadcasters, NGOs, universities, unions or minority organization. 
 
Reforms to democratize the media sector are, however, a contentious political topic. 
Commercial media in Chile lobbied strongly to keep stricter advertisement rules for 
community radios, fearing that their own market shares would decrease. The re-diversification 
of media ownership proves to be even harder. Through the new media law, Argentina 
demands some ―de-investment‖ in monopolistic structures; unsurprisingly, the government 
finds itself facing hostile media campaigns and several lawsuits concerned with those clauses 
(Hauser, 2010; Hervieu, 2010). 
 
                                               
8
 Recent conflicts in Bolivia provide a good example. ―Independent‖ newspapers, controlled by different owners, 
exchanged content and copied each other’s editorial sections, when it came to opposing the president’s position 
toward the Constitutional Assembly in 2006 and 2007 (Hetzer, 2010, p. 180). 
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Two caveats concerning the role of governments and technological innovations must be 
mentioned at this point. First, debates about media regulation are always fought with 
arguments about freedom of the press, which needs to be defended against intrusive 
governments. However, these arguments are often misused by commercial companies to 
circumvent any regulatory intervention.
9
 This is not to say that governments do not try to 
influence media. There are, on the contrary, numerous examples, including the discretionary 
use of public advertisement funds to reward or punish private media. In March 2011, for 
example, the Supreme Court in Argentina obliged the government to balance the distribution 
of those funds, following a lawsuit filed by an oppositional newspaper (Becerra, 2011). 
However, in the context of media power that is primarily commercially structured, the debates 
on the democratization focused less on the role of government. In trying to mirror the thrust of 
the debates, this paper has not paid specific attention to that aspect. 
Second, technological innovations change regulatory needs. But even with low market entry 
costs to internet communication and a virtually unlimited number of channels in a digitalized 
spectrum, there is still a need for regulating democratic access to provide a plurality of 
perspectives. We have seen that an increase in the number of available sources neither 
necessarily leads to an increase in content diversity nor automatically contributes to 
dispersing ownership. The past has shown on a regular basis that new technologies are 





Audiovisual products have a double character. On the one hand, they are tradable goods with 
very small marginal costs and no rivalry in consumption. Large and concentrated markets are 
therefore economically attractive for businesses. On the other hand, audiovisual products are 
central to the quality of democratic debates as ―questions of media access, diversity, 
ownership and content regulation define the type and quality of public sphere within a nation 
or region‖ (Dahlgren, 1995; Galperín, 1999, p. 629).  
 
                                               
9
 In Argentina, the new media law was frequently presented by its opponents and by European media as a 
personal revenge of president Cristina Fernández against the Clarín group (Repoll, 2010). This perspective, 
however, largely neglects the origins and the content of the law. 
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The regulation of a plural broadcasting landscape is thus a tricky issue. Direct censorship of 
governments is uncommon; as a result of the deregulatory reforms, among other factors, it has 
been replaced with other, especially commercial, mechanisms restraining plurality of 
information or privileging certain (depoliticized and consumerist) perspectives (Bennett, 
2004, p. 129). Current debates in Latin America, initiated by social movements around 
community radios, therefore focus on the democratization and decommodification of the 
media market. The media reforms discussed here have, to a varying degree, addressed this 
problem and sought to advance plurality and democratize access to the broadcasting sector. 
Chile, however, has still a long way to go. The reservation of large parts of the spectrum for 
non-commercial media in the other two countries opens up the communication sphere for new 
actors such as social movements, educative or religious groups, and community organizations. 
This regulation might promote not only a ―commercial diversity‖ with limited plurality of 
perspectives but also a more meaningful plurality of different types of communicators. 
 
The legislative changes discussed in this paper have all been introduced very recently. It 
remains to be seen if the plurality of voices in the radiomagnetic spectrum will increase. 
Much depends on an active communication movement, regulatory ―details‖, such as the 
height of administration fees, transparency of application procedures, or technical standards, 
as well as the conduct of regulatory institutions. Bureaucrats might use administrative 
discretion to hinder some broadcasters. These issues constitute widespread problems for 
community radios, although the changed institutional structure—more independence from the 
executive and the inclusion of several stakeholders—in Argentina and partly Uruguay might 
provide some safeguards in Argentina and partly in Uruguay. Only in Chile, broadcasters are 
not represented in regulatory bodies, which leads to frequent complaints about its lacking 
responsiveness toward social and political aspects of communication. 
 
Regulatory responses to the problems of concentration and commercialization are, in certain 
aspects, similar in the region. This is true for the focus on community radios and, partially, the 
changed institutional structures. The spread and diffusion of reforms to democratize media 
markets is thus a relevant research topic, enabling us to understand the role of transnational 
communication and learning among actors, as well as the importance of international regimes 
(e.g., the IACHR) in the conflicts on media regulation. It would also be interesting to examine 
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if the presented regulatory changes alter the relationship between powerful media companies, 
the political elite and society. 
 
Despite all their democratic potential, community radios are no panacea for the problems of 
commercially structured media markets. They constitute mass media, but operate on a 
precarious and, as their name already indicates, local basis. Their promotion, albeit important, 
therefore does not substitute for political initiatives tailored to deal with the oligopolistic 
nature of the media markets. Since reforms in this area are very difficult to implement 
politically, the conflictive debates about the role that mass media does and should play in a 
democratic society will (hopefully) continue. Such debates inevitably point to the 
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